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 Understanding The Experiences
 Of The Politics Of Urbanization
 In Two Gecekondu
 (Squatter) Neighborhoods
 Under Two Urban Regimes:
 Ethnography In The Urban Periphery
 Of Ankara, Turkey
 Tahire Erman
 Department of Political Science
 Bilkent University
 ABSTRACT: This article investigates the politics of urbanization
 in the Turkish context. It is built upon the premise that the "urban
 coalition" in the era of nationalist developmentalism, which was
 populist in nature, is replaced by a "new urban coalition," a neo-
 liberal one, since the 1980s. I argue that the bargaining power of
 gecekondu (squatter) residents with municipal authorities for their
 "extra-legal" practices in building their houses in the former era was
 lost after neoliberal policies were adopted. This argument is sub-
 stantiated by the ethnographic field work in which the experiences
 of gecekondu residents in building, improving and (not) defending
 their houses and neighborhoods were obtained. Two ethnographic
 studies were conducted in two different sites in Ankara: a neighbor-
 hood where the Alevis were the majority, which became the site of
 leftist mobilization in the 1970s, and a district where conservative
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 Sunnis lived, who supported right-wing politics. By situating the
 two neighborhoods in the context of the two different urban re-
 gimes, namely, those in the populist and neoliberal eras, the article
 points out the changing relationship of the gecekondu residents with
 the state, showing variances with respect to the differing political
 positions and social compositions of the two neighborhoods.
 Introduction
 This article investigates, in general, the politics of urbaniza-
 tion in the Turkish context, which is also the politics of gecekon-
 dus.1 Specifically, it investigates the changing relationship of
 gecekondu residents with the state in the pre- and post-1980
 periods. The state's approach to those who built their homes
 in "extra-legal" ways on land that did not belong to them
 has attracted scholarly attention since the emergence of the
 "gecekondu problem" in the 1950s (e.g., Abraham 1964; Karpat
 1976; §enyapili 1982; Danielson and Kele§ 1985). Recent devel-
 opments in cities, such as large-scale urban transformations that
 target the neighborhoods of the urban poor, have accentuated
 this interest (e.g., Karaman 2008; Unsal and Kuyucu 2010).
 While studying the relationship of gecekondu residents with
 the state, it is helpful to make a distinction between the pre-
 1980 period, which was the era of national developmentalism,
 and the post-1980s, during which neoliberal urban policies and
 practices were introduced. They refer to two different "urban
 regimes." Accordingly, in the Turkish context, it is argued that
 urbanization in the pre-1980 period was "soft and integrative"
 in which the rent appropriated from urban land was distributed
 to a large segment of society through gecekondu owners and
 small-scale developers ( yapsatgis : "one-man firms"). However,
 as cities started to be transformed under the neoliberal regime
 since the 1980s, a new type of urbanization (a "tense and ex-
 clusionary urbanization") began to dominate, which brought
 disadvantages to the gecekondu population: the peripheral land,
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 which was left to the use of the poor until then, began to be
 claimed by big capital (I§ik and Pinarcioglu 2001). This article,
 by relying on empirical data obtained from two ethnographies,
 one of them conducted in an Alevi2 and the other one in a
 Sunni gecekondu neighborhood, aims to bring substance to this
 argument. By situating the two neighborhoods in the context
 of the two different urban regimes, it aspires to uncover the
 experiences of gecekondu dwellers regarding their changing
 relationship with their homes and communities and, more
 importantly, with the state.
 Moving beyond the homogenized image of gecekondus, this
 article further aims to demonstrate the varied experiences of
 gecekondu residents in building, improving and (not) defend-
 ing their houses, neighborhoods and communities, based on
 the distinctive characteristics of the two neighborhoods: in
 this case study, sectarian identities (Ale vis vs. Sunnis) and
 political positions (left-wing vs. right-wing). I argue that the
 characteristics of the gecekondu neighborhoods are largely
 shaped by their geographical locations. In the research, the
 two gecekondu settlements had different locations in the city,
 which had an effect on their social composition (see Figure 1).
 One of the sites was located in the northern periphery of the
 city, which received rural migrants who were predominantly
 Sunni Muslims, whereas the second site was located in the
 eastern periphery of the city, which received a large number
 of rural migrants from the villages of the provinces of Central
 Anatolia that have been the habitus of Alevis for centuries. As
 a result, the two sites went through different experiences, par-
 ticularly in their relationship with the state and their political
 engagement.
 In brief, this article presents two different gecekondu neigh-
 borhoods in the "urban regimes" of the two different eras,
 namely, the pre- and post- 1980s (populist vs. neoliberal respec-
 tively). I argue that the relationship of gecekondu residents with
 the state is shaped by the urban regime of the time. Accordingly,
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 the article makes its contributions by bringing empirical data
 to this argument, and presents information on how gecekondu
 people experienced the two urban regimes in their lives.
 Regimes of Accumulation, Urban Regimes and Urban Co-
 alitions
 Regulation theory informs us about the changes the capital-
 ist state went through as it responded to the structural changes
 in the economy following the crises of the 1970s: the "post-Ford-
 ist" (neoliberal) regime of accumulation replaced the Fordist
 one based on Keynesian principles of full employment and
 universalistic welfare provision (Painter 1993). The Fordist
 regime of accumulation based on mass production and mass
 consumption between the 1940s and 1970s, more specifically
 the period from 1945 to 1974, gave way to the post-Fordist
 regime of accumulation based on flexible production and spe-
 cialized "niche" forms of consumption (late 1970s until today).
 Accordingly, a new urban regime and new urban conditions
 have emerged in this era since the late 1970s, more so since the
 1990s (Painter 1993). Moreover, while "(i)n the Fordist mode of
 development we find that land and housing was decommodi-
 fied to an important extent, . . . (w)ith the crisis of Fordism, . . .a
 recommodification of land and urban property" was observed
 (Jager 2003: 246).
 In the Turkish context, rather than the welfare state of the
 Fordist era in the economically developed West, the "populist
 state" was the major actor in producing a relatively inclusive
 society by distributing some rent from urban land (I§ik and
 Pinarcioglu 2001). In the early stages of gecekondu development,
 the urban poor did not pay rent because they lived in the houses
 they constructed, and in later years, as gecekondus were pulled
 into the housing market as the cities expanded toward their
 peripheries, some even became owners of apartments by sell-
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 FIGURE 1. A Map of Mamak Where Alevis Settled
 ing their gecekondu land to yapsatgi. The private sector was out
 of urban rent appropriation when the state's aim at national
 industrialization by protecting the domestic manufacturing
 market from international competition brought much profit
 to it (Keyder 2000). This lack of interest of both the private
 sector and the state in the urban land brought advantages to
 gecekondu owners to improve their lives and positions in so-
 ciety. Thus, gecekondus acted as the welfare system in Turkey,
 a society with scarce resources (Baglevent and Dayoglu 2005).
 In other words, the welfare state in the Fordist era in the West
 corresponds to the populist state in the same era in Turkey.
 As in the West, this populist era was abandoned in the period
 of economic liberalization in the 1980s (Keyder 2000). A new
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 type of urbanization emerged, characterized by its exclusion-
 ary practices and increased competition over urban land (I§ik
 and Pmarcioglu 2001). As neoliberal capitalism inserted its
 rules into society, the national bourgeoisie, protected by the
 state against international competition in the previous era
 of national developmentalism, began to reorient itself; as the
 country opened itself to global capital and foreign consumption
 goods, it shifted its investments from industrial production to
 other sectors, including the land and construction markets.
 Thus, the urban land rent began to be appropriated by big
 capital. Specifically big companies bought cheap land without
 development plans ( imar plant) on the peripheries of cities, and
 when the land was opened to development by the municipal
 government, they made huge profits from the land ("devel-
 opment rent") (I§ik and Pinarcioglu 2001). Different from the
 limited rent to be appropriated by the yapsatgi by building a
 single block on the plot, big construction companies appropri-
 ated enormous rent by building large-scale housing projects,
 as well as shopping malls and entertainment complexes for the
 upper classes. In this process, the state played a significant role
 in transferring the rent through private-public partnerships
 (Unsal and Kuyucu 2010).
 In brief, two different urban regimes prevailed in the two
 different regimes of accumulation in the Turkish context,
 namely, populist and neoliberal urban regimes. While in the
 populist urban regime, gecekondu owners were advantageous
 because of the fact that they were tolerated by the state to build
 gecekondus to live in and later to appropriate gecekondu land
 rent, in the neoliberal urban regime they lost their leverage
 when urban peripheral land became a too-profitable asset to
 leave to gecekondu residents.
 The concept of the "urban growth coalition" has been in-
 troduced to refer to urban politics and governance in which
 the landed elites, such as "rentiers" (place entrepreneurs), local
 politicians and the local media, in their common interests of
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 making profit by attracting investment to their locality, form
 coalitions (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987). Recently,
 growing private sector involvement in urban governance is
 acknowledged in the literature, building partnerships with
 the public sector, mainly with municipal authorities (Harding
 et al. 2000). The concept of the "urban coalition" has been de-
 veloped with a change in the original meaning of the "urban
 growth coalition" concept to refer to the alliance formed to ap-
 propriate urban land rent, which is escalating as the economy
 moves from manufacturing to real estate. Accordingly, several
 Turkish scholars used the terms "populist urban coalition" and
 "neoliberal urban coalition" to refer to urban governance in the
 pre- and post-1980s periods (e.g., Unsal and Kuyucu 2010).
 Before moving to the two gecekondu settlements, brief infor-
 mation on gecekondu development in Turkey is provided below.
 This helps contextualize the research sites in the socio-economic
 and political conditions of Turkey.
 Gecekondu Development in Turkey: Populist Urban Coali-
 tions in the Pre-1980s
 Gecekondu settlements as a sociophysical phenomenon ap-
 peared in the urban landscape in Turkey following World War
 II, although some shanties were built here and there earlier,
 particularly in Ankara during the construction boom when
 it was declared as the modern capital of the new Republic
 in 1923 (§enyapili 2004). Gecekondu development in big cities
 was the result of "fast depeasantization and slow workeriza-
 tion" when massive displacement in the countryside caused
 by the mechanization of agriculture to increase productivity
 was not accompanied by the same level of industrialization
 in cities (Kiray 1970). This was the result of the Marshall Plan
 of the United States (U.S.), when Turkey, allied with the U.S.,
 was situated as a buffer zone between the "Communist Bloc"
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 under the control of the former Soviet Union and the "Western
 Bloc" under the leadership of the U.S. Especially small farm-
 ers, sharecroppers and agricultural tenants, in their search for
 a new livelihood, started to move to big cities, particularly
 to Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir (§enyapili 1998, 2004). The cit-
 ies were not ready to accommodate such a large number of
 newcomers, most of whom were poor. The economic policy
 of the time that aimed at rapid industrialization required the
 channeling of the national budget to industrial development
 and the construction of infrastructure, including highways
 and power plants (Oncii 1988). In this economic model, spar-
 ing money to build social housing for poor migrants was out
 of the question. Thus, the solution to the housing problem of
 the incoming poor migrants came to be to let them build their
 own houses, lifting this responsibility from the state. Migrants
 built their houses on land that did not belong to them, usually
 on public land. This "extra-legal" existence rendered them
 vulnerable before the state. The name given to squatter hous-
 ing in Turkey (the gecekondu) implies the unapproved nature
 of their construction: to escape the attention of authorities,
 migrants would build their houses at night and as quickly as
 possible. They would put up four walls and a roof, and on the
 roof they would place a Turkish flag signifying their loyalty
 to the state, and on the windows they would hang curtains to
 give the image that the house was inhabited (Payne 1982). The
 law of 1924 that required a court order in order to demolish an
 inhabited dwelling worked to the advantage of the gecekondu
 people and protected their homes against immediate demoli-
 tion (Payne 1982).
 Poor migrants from the countryside started building their
 houses close to job opportunities, i.e., close to the city center
 (e.g., Altindag in Ankara, which was close to the city center of
 the time, Ulus; it would be called "the golden hill," indicat-
 ing its promise of wealth) and to factories (e.g., Zeytinburnu
 in Istanbul, where the tannery industry was located, and in
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 Kazligegme nearby) (§enyapili 1998, 2004). As these areas were
 rapidly consumed by the large waves of migration, the unoccu-
 pied land in the peripheries of the cities became the new target
 of gecekondu development. The fact that most of the peripheral
 land belonged to the state (treasury land - hazine arazisi), and
 not to individuals, made it easier for state authorities to turn a
 blind eye to this development, and a tacit agreement between
 gecekondu settlers and state authorities developed (Keyder
 2000). The voting potential of the gecekondu population was
 quickly noticed by the politicians who made promises of ser-
 vices and infrastructure, and more importantly, of title deeds to
 gecekondu people in return for their votes and political loyalty.
 This brought to the gecekondu population some bargaining pow-
 er (§enyapili 1982), and gecekondus mushroomed. Gecekondu
 amnesties were passed and title deeds were distributed during
 election times. Despite the reaction of the urban elite to the
 "ruralization of their cities" (Erman 2001), gecekondus became
 a permanent feature of big cities in Turkey.
 The improvements in gecekondu neighborhoods went hand
 in hand with the increasing role of the gecekondu population in
 the economy. They were the cheap labor force much needed by
 the private sector in the import-substituting industrialization
 that relied on the import of expensive foreign technology and
 capital (§enyapili 1982). They were also the consumers in the
 domestic market, whose role as consumers was again much
 needed by the private sector in the closed economy of the time
 (§enyapili 1982).
 In brief, in this era of the politics of urbanization until the
 1980s, there was a "populist urban coalition" between politi-
 cians seeking loyalty, industrialists in need of cheap labor for
 profit, gecekondu dwellers seeking affordable housing, and a
 state that was more interested in national industrialization
 than social welfare provision, including social housing for the
 poor (Unsal and Kuyucu 2010). This "urban coalition" did not
 function smoothly at all times, and the actors were not equals:
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 it was built on the asymmetric relations between the state and
 the gecekondu population: the lack of titles deprived gecekondu
 people of property rights, rendering them vulnerable before
 state authorities. On the other hand, as some gecekondu own-
 ers obtained their titles, usually during election times, this
 increased their bargaining power with the state for the up-
 grading of their neighborhoods (Heper 1982). However, state
 authorities were often reluctant to distribute titles to gecekondu
 owners, probably since this would weaken their power over
 the gecekondu population (Keyder 2000).
 Over the years, the state attempted to regulate this ex-
 panding "extra-legality" in housing. The first comprehensive
 gecekondu law (Law no. 775) was passed in 1966. It aimed at the
 upgrading of those gecekondus in good condition, the demoli-
 tion of those in poor condition and at undesirable locations,
 and the prohibition of new gecekondu construction. Only the
 first goal was accomplished to some degree. The other two
 goals, because of populist politics and resource scarcity, were
 never put into action (Danielson and Keleg 1985). By the 1970s,
 gecekondu settlements had become low-density established
 neighborhoods (§enyapili 1982).
 This "populist urban coalition" which was less than perfect,
 nonetheless allowed the integration of the gecekondu popula-
 tion into urban society in economic and physical terms. Yet,
 urbanites were discontent with this development; they were
 unwilling to share their cultural institutions with them, putting
 severe limits on the "cultural integration" of rural migrants into
 urban society (§enyapili 1982). For the established urbanites,
 they were the "rural Other" who failed to become urban, con-
 stituting an obstacle to Turkish modernization (Erman 2001).
 There were some challenges to this urban coalition in the
 1970s by the rising leftist movement. Leftists emphasized the
 use value of gecekondus and tried to keep profit-making ("ex-
 change value") from the gecekondu land. They targeted the
 gecekondu population to "raise consciousness" as the "working
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 class" acting against their exploitation by the "capitalist class"
 (Asian 2004). This leftist mobilization was interrupted by the
 state's memorandum of March 12, 1971. The military regime
 closed down all the neighborhood beautification associations in
 gecekondu areas; and "(t)he demolitions (of gecekondus) became a
 significant aspect of the military regime determined to "restore
 order" in the cities" (Batuman 2008: 1933). The leftist movement
 gained back its momentum in the 1970s and continued with its
 mission of transforming society in radical terms. Through the
 "liberated territories" projects in gecekondu neighborhoods, it
 aimed to create localities organized as a socio-spatial collectiv-
 ity out of the control of the state, in which local people would
 run their locality through people's committees (halk komiteleri)
 (Asian 2004).
 By the 1970s, an informal gecekondu market emerged, in
 which money and profit was involved (Alpar and Yener 1991).
 It was controlled by the mafia in some cases. The mafia, who
 would usually be small local groups organized informally,
 would enclose public or agricultural land to sell it to prospec-
 tive gecekondu builders, even advertising it in newspapers
 (Payne 1982). In their profit-oriented practices, they would now
 and then invade private land, intimidating the owners by using
 force. Some would also have connections with paramilitary
 groups. The disadvantages which rural migrants started to face
 in building gecekondus increased the attraction of leftist groups
 for them, who promised protection against the mafia and
 houses with use value. Some gecekondu neighborhoods allied
 with the organized leftist power and went through the experi-
 ence of "liberated territoriesm," particularly those gecekondu
 neighborhoods where Alevis were spatially concentrated. Ex-
 amples of these neighborhoods in various cities are: the May
 Day neighborhood in Umraniye (today it is called Mustafa
 Kemal district) (Asian 2004), Giilsuyu in Maltepe (Bozkulak
 2005) and Okmeydaru in §i§li (Massicard 2005), all in Istanbul,
 Tuzlugayir in Mamak (Ankara), and Giiltepe in Konak (Izmir);
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 all were receptive to the political projects of the left. In Giilsuyu
 in the 1970s, there was an unorganized resistance in the begin-
 ning to the attempts oigecekondu demolition. Later on, under the
 leadership of leftist university students, it was transformed into
 an organized action. The fact that it was a poor neighborhood
 where Alevis were the majority helped the locality gain a politi-
 cal identity (Bozkulak 2005). This was similar in Okmeydani,
 which also housed mostly the Alevi working class (Massicard
 2005). Thus, an alliance of the gecekondu population with leftist
 groups was formed, and started challenging the former urban
 coalition among the gecekondu population, the private sector
 and the state.
 In the late 1970s, leftist uprising in society was counteracted
 by ultranationalists, who became a strong counterveiling force
 against "communists." Unprecedented violence erupted when
 the groups with counter ideologies, armed with guns, started
 fighting. In this politicized and polarized society, gecekondu
 areas soon came to be fiercely contested between the rival
 sides. It is important to stress that, although gecekondu areas
 were inflicted by violence, violence did not originate in them
 (Danielson and Keleg 1985). In brief, "the politics of disorder"
 characterized the 1970s (Danielson and Keleg 1985).
 The unrest and violence in society was ended by a military
 coup on September 12, 1980. This violent interruption started a
 new era for Turkish society, radically different from the previ-
 ous era in terms of its economic policies and political visions,
 leading to a "new urban coalition," a neoliberal one.
 New Developments in Gecekondu Areas: Neoliberal Urban
 Coalitions in the Post-1980s
 The 1980s witnessed the shift from the state-protected na-
 tional economy based on import- substituting industrialization
 to the neoliberal export-oriented economy. The new economy
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 policy was initiated by the January 24, 1980 Decisions by
 Ozal when he was the Prime Ministry's undersecretary and
 the acting undersecretary of the State Planning Organization.
 In this new era, we can identify two major developments in
 gecekondu areas. The first, which started in the 1980s, is about
 transforming gecekondu areas into apartment districts, in which
 the rent appropriated from the process would be shared be-
 tween gecekondu owners and yapsatqis (Igik and Pinarcioglu
 2001). The second development, which started in the 2000s,
 is again about the transformation of gecekondu areas, but this
 time the rent from the gecekondu land would be appropriated
 by municipal governments, some state authorities (mainly the
 Prime Ministry's Mass Housing Administration [MHA]), and
 big construction firms and developers.
 Regarding the first development, through a series of laws
 and amendments between 1983 and 1987, the government at-
 tempted to integrate gecekondus into the formal housing market.
 In law no. 2981, which was passed in 1984, the construction of
 up to four storey apartment buildings on gecekondu lots was
 allowed. Yapsatqis would be the main actors of this physical
 transformation; they would buy the gecekondu land from the
 owner in exchange for several apartments in the building to be
 built on the gecekondu plot. This law accomplished two goals: on
 the one hand, it opened peripheral land to commercialization
 under market forces, and on the other hand, as §enyapili (1998)
 argues, it prevented social unrest by providing economic gains
 to the urban poor, who had become highly disadvantaged in the
 liberalization of the economy. Accordingly, the urban coalition
 of the former era was developed further that included gecekondu
 owners who were enabled by the new law to participate in the
 formal housing market, yapsatqis in the private sector, and mu-
 nicipal authorities who were authorized to make development
 plans ( imar planlari) of the districts. Municipal governments,
 by holding the power to make decisions about which districts
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 would be provided with the plans, still preserved their bargain-
 ing power with the gecekondu population.
 In this new era, the gecekondu mafia flourished in the real
 estate market, turning into large organized groups built upon
 common place of origin. It overlapped with membership in
 ethnic and religious communities ( cemaat ) in some cases. The
 support networks of the earlier era based on common place of
 origin tended to turn into mafia-like organizations as gecekondus
 were commodified and legalized in the lucrative housing and
 land market, and as competition over urban peripheral land
 sharpened3 (Igik and Pinarcioglu 2001). This was more true in
 the case of Istanbul, which is the economic capital of the coun-
 try, than in other cities. The mafia would invade large tracks
 of land by using aggressive methods, including resorting to
 force and bribing, and build multi-story apartment buildings
 on them. An "illegal city" could be constructed as the outcome,
 as in the case of Sultanbeyli in Istanbul where even the town
 hall lacks a legal title deed.
 In the restructuring of the housing market, MHA was es-
 tablished in 1984 to provide credits mostly to housing coopera-
 tives to activate the housing market. As middle-class housing
 cooperatives were established, the urban periphery began to
 be transformed, and the gecekondu land began to change hands
 (Oncii 1997). Some gecekondu people started improving their
 economic conditions as the result of exchanging their gecekondu
 land with several apartments. A "new class" of rural migrants
 emerged, who were regarded as the "undeserving rich Other":
 "who once built their gecekondus in one night and now they
 were becoming millionaires in one day" (Erman 2001: 994).
 With respect to the second development, by the 1990s, the
 profit-oriented reappropriation of the peripheral land increased
 by the new claims on it. In the new economy, the urban real
 estate market was seen as a major profit-generating mechanism.
 Gated communities, i.e., luxurious houses protected by high-
 tech and privatized security industry for the upper classes, and
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 site s, i.e., multi-story suburban housing for the middle classes,
 were built by big construction companies on the fringes of the
 cities (Oncii 1997).
 However, a full neoliberal urban regime could only develop
 in the 2000s. Under the rule of the economically liberal and
 politically conservative Justice and Development Party (JDP),4
 which controlled both the central government and most of the
 municipalities in the 2000s, a "new spatial regime" with its
 own ideology and institutions was established. It functioned
 in accordance with the prevailing economic rationale of the
 neoliberal era. The attitude of the state towards gecekondus was
 completely reversed: the "zero gecekondu" policy replaced the
 populist policies of the former era. As Keyder (2000) argues,
 when neoliberalism becomes the order of the day, populist
 policies are bound to erode. While the Ozal government in
 the 1980s attempted to transform gecekondu areas through the
 intervention of yapsatgis, allowing both gecekondu owners (i.e.,
 the urban poor) and yapsatgis (i.e., those actors in the construc-
 tion sector that had limited capital) to get shares from the
 rent appropriated from the peripheral urban land, this time a
 transformation model in which the rent would be appropriated
 by big capital was adopted. Thus, in the massive restructur-
 ing of cities, a new neoliberal urban coalition emerged that
 was radically different from the earlier one. The major actors
 in this new coalition would be large-scale private developers,
 big construction firms, national and international financiers,
 and real estate investment trusts, various state agencies, such
 as MHA, and metropolitan and district municipalities (Unsal
 and Kuyucu 2010). The state and municipal authorities would
 participate directly in the appropriation of urban rent.
 In this new era of neoliberal urbanism, state and municipal
 institutions, as well as MHA, were reformed. Through a series
 of laws, municipalities became major actors in the restructur-
 ing of cities since the 1980s. In 1985, the Development /Plan-
 ning Law no. 3194 ( imar Kanunu) authorized municipalities to
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 prepare development plans for their cities, which curbed the
 role of the central planning state authorities, bringing greater
 power to local governments and making them the most power-
 ful political actors in the decisionmaking about the distribution
 of urban rent. Through piecemeal planning, they obtained the
 power to decide which parts of the city to develop, and thus
 who would make profit from their land (Ye§il 2008). A two-tier
 municipal system, which was enacted in 1984, brought more
 power to metropolitan municipalities in initiating "prestigious
 mega-projects" (Karaman 2008). Moreover, the laws that were
 passed in 2004 (no. 5216) and 2005 (no. 5393), and particularly
 the law no. 5366, authorized both the metropolitan and district
 municipalities to intervene in the neighborhoods of the urban
 poor to implement renewal projects. "Urban transformation
 projects" (UTPs) began to be implemented both in deteriorated
 historic inner-city districts and gecekondu areas in the periph-
 eries of the cities. In the former, the aim was to "regenerate"
 the housing stock by renovating the buildings, and hence to
 make them attractive to the upper classes, and in the latter, to
 transform low-density gecekondu areas into high-rise "modern"
 apartment districts. Consequently, municipal governments
 have started employing aggressive strategies to restructure
 cities, opening potentially profitable spaces to investment
 through UTPs (Unsal and Kuyucu 2010).
 Moreover, MHA was restructured starting in 2002 after
 the JDP came to power. The laws that were passed since then
 [particularly the amendments made in the Law of Mass Hous-
 ing (Law no. 2985)], by endowing it with the duty of the direct
 supply of housing, made MHA a major actor in the construction
 sector. Today MHA can transfer public land for free to circulate
 it in the private market. It can also form partnerships with the
 private sector. In the latter case, either the construction firm
 pays MHA for the land transferred to it or gives MHA shares
 from the profit it makes from its housing project ( hasilat payla§im
 modeli ).5 MHA has also become a major actor in UTPs: munici-
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 pal governments sign protocols with MH A to implement UTPs,
 and after solving legal problems regarding land and property
 ownership, which is a complicated and controversial process
 in both inner-city districts and gecekondu areas, they prepare
 the land for MHA to construct the UTP.6
 In this process of constructing UTPs, gecekondu people were
 displaced when their houses and long-established neighbor-
 hoods were demolished, and they were usually relocated
 to faraway locations (Karaman 2008). Much of the rent in
 gecekondu areas is today being transferred to the private sector
 through municipal governments (Karaman 2008). Moreover,
 MHA's domination in the construction sector is "displacing"
 small actors in the construction business, i.e., yapsatgis, while
 the big capital is increasing its profit by building gated com-
 munities, shopping malls, and entertainment complexes on
 the urban periphery.
 In this era, new discourses have emerged that define
 gecekondu areas as the sites of crime, decay and radicalism,
 as "tumors that have surrounded our cities, which should be
 removed by surgical operations such as urban transformation
 projects" (Prime Minister's speech quoted in Unsal and Kuyucu
 2010: 54). Gecekondu residents are further defined as "shameless
 invaders of precious urban land" (Karaman 2008), and in the
 new Criminal Code that was passed in 2004, gecekondu construc-
 tion was made a criminal offense (Unsal and Kuyucu 2010).
 In brief, in this new coalition under neoliberal urban prac-
 tices, the losers are those at the lower level of society: small-
 scale developers, gecekondu residents without title deeds, and
 gecekondu tenants. Gecekondu owners with title deeds also be-
 come disadvantaged as their bargaining power with develop-
 ers for several apartments is curbed by urban transformation
 projects (UTPs), in which they are given one apartment in a
 MHA building in return for their gecekondu land.
 As the gecekondu land is transferred from gecekondu people to
 the municipality, sometimes by force, sometimes by manipula-
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 tion, and rarely by consent, gecekondu settlements become ripe
 for local resistance. While former liberated territories where
 Alevis are the majority tend to organize themselves against the
 UTPs, gecekondu neighborhoods inhabited by religious/ conser-
 vative people (mostly Sunnis), who lack an oppositional culture
 and who express their loyalty to the ruling JDP, seem to comply
 easily with the demands of municipal authorities.
 After this introduction to the development and transfor-
 mation of gecekondu settlements in the Turkish context, the
 two gecekondu neighborhoods in the fieldwork are presented
 below with a focus on the urban coalitions' workings on the
 ground.
 Workings of the Populist and Neoliberal Urban Coalitions on
 the Ground: The Ethnographic Fieldwork of Two Gecekondu
 Neighborhoods
 The two case studies were investigated in different projects.7
 The major aim of the first project was to investigate the experi-
 ences of displacement in the Northern Ankara Entrance Urban
 Transformation Project (NAEUTP). In-depth interviews (95)
 and questionnaires (160) were carried out with those whose
 gecekondus were demolished in the project. They were visited
 first in their apartments in the municipality's temporary hous-
 ing ( lojman ), and later in their apartments in the MHA's hous-
 ing project after construction of the buildings was completed.
 Detailed information was gathered about how they constructed
 their gecekondus and how they established their neighborhood.
 The second project investigated the role of place in politics,
 including identity politics and political mobilization. It started
 in 2000 and continued in intervals: between 2000 and 2003, 100
 in-depth interviews were conducted, and participant observa-
 tion was undertaken during regular visits to the research site.
 Using the oral history technique, efforts were made to collect
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 information on the past of the neighborhood by reaching those
 who directly witnessed the "liberated territory" period. In
 the following years, the neighborhood was visited occasion-
 ally to observe the changes in the lives of the people and the
 neighborhood.
 When we look at the case studies, the two gecekondu settle-
 ments share some characteristics, while they differ in some
 ways due to their different political engagements and orien-
 tations. What is common in both cases is people's hard labor
 that they put into building their houses and neighborhoods.
 It was a big challenge for the people in both gecekondu sites
 to construct houses under precarious conditions defined by
 limited economic resources and illegal land occupation. In the
 sections below, first the conservative Sunni site in the populist
 and neoliberal urban regimes is presented, followed by the
 oppositional Alevi site.
 A Neighborhood in the Northern Urban Periphery: The Lo-
 cality of Conservative Sunnis
 This neighborhood was in the north of the city on the route
 connecting the city to the airport. It was built on steep slopes;
 and the houses were scattered without a particular order. The
 neighborhood had basic services and infrastructure. Yet, resi-
 dents had uneven access to them due to their location: while
 those living down the hill were better serviced, disadvantages
 increased for those living up the hill. Many of the residents
 were from the villages of the provincial districts of Ankara
 and from the villages of the provinces close to Ankara, mainly
 conservative towns largely inhabited by Sunni Muslims (see
 Table 1). They mostly supported the ruling JDP.
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 TABLE 1. Administrative Districts From Which The Sunni
 Respondents In The Northern Periphery Of
 Ankara Came.


















 In the section below, the experiences of poor people in
 building their houses and neighborhood are presented; and
 quotations from in-depth interviews are provided to bring in
 people's voices.
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 Building The Gecekondu, The Neighborhood, And The Community
 In The 1970s: The Era Of The Populist Urban Regime
 The development of this neighborhood goes back to the
 1970s when people started building shanty-like houses. The
 area was vacant then: some agricultural land and mostly steep
 hills. The invasion of land and the construction of gecekondus
 was not an organized act; it happened by the acts of small
 groups of relatives and family members. People learned from
 each other (e.g., from their fellow villagers in the city or from
 their friends at the workplace) about the availability of land
 for gecekondu construction. In their search for numeral strength,
 they would invite their relatives, both those living in the city
 and back in the village, to come to construct houses in their
 vicinity. If relatives did not join them, it would be the husband
 and the wife who would construct the house, occasionally by
 the help of a paid craftsman. The outcome was shabby struc-
 tures scattered here and there.
 The neighborhood was built on the slopes of a rocky hill.
 Residents carved out steps in the rocks to be able to reach their
 houses. The houses, because of the steep slope, were usually
 built like train cars, one room opening into the other; and if
 the family could afford it, the house would have a terrace-like
 balcony. Despite geographical disadvantages, i.e., limited flat
 land and small amount of soil, most families had gardens in
 which they grew vegetables and fruit trees. They had to carry
 soil up to the house in order to make a garden because gar-
 dens contributed psychologically and economically to their
 well-being, as stated by many respondents:
 In the summer time, after I woke up in the morning, I
 would immediately go out into my garden. I would work in the
 garden, watering the trees and taking caring of them. I would
 eat their fresh fruits. I had a bird; it would visit the garden
 everyday, twittering cheerfully. I loved being in my garden.
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 I had a garden, I had a balcony. My balcony was very
 large. We would sit there with neighbors, chatting and drink-
 ing tea.... There was almost no soil. We carried it so that we
 would have a garden. We had roses, quince trees and apricot
 trees. We made it happen. Why? It is because greenery is very
 important to us.
 Thus, in these spatial practices, they created environments
 that responded to their needs and desires. This enabled them
 to reproduce, to some extent, their village environment (single-
 storey houses in gardens). Yet the production of such environ-
 ments led to the stigmatization of gecekondu areas in society as
 the place of peasants (Erman 2001).
 They put a lot of effort into building their gecekondus, as
 described in the quotation below:
 I did not know where the place was. My husband took
 me there. It was on a very steep slope, no paths, no light; you
 just keep climbing up and up. I said to my husband, "This is
 not a flat land; it is rocky. How can we build a house here? We
 will slide down." My husband went down and came with a
 digger he rented. The machine came up to the lot by opening
 a path behind it. The land was all stones, and the digger lev-
 eled it. We did not have any money to buy bricks and wood.
 We had three young children, and my husband did not have
 a regular income. He borrowed money from a relative. By this
 money we bought some bricks, roof titles and wood, and the
 rest we put in installments. We brought the materials in a car,
 but the car could not go up to our lot, so we carried them on
 our backs.
 It was difficult to build the house physically in such a
 tough geography, and it also put much economic strain on
 people's limited financial resources:
 We built it with our own meager means. The suffering we
 had, it is hard to describe. There was only a tiny path used by
 the cattle. We carried the bricks and cement on our backs. I
 suffer from slipped disc today. I wish those rocks could speak
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 to tell you about our sufferings. To reach our house, we would
 climb up 250-300 steps and climb down 250-300 steps, it was
 in the middle of the hillside. We suffered a lot.
 In the urban regime of the time, the state and municipality
 were there to bargain for infrastructure and services. Interest-
 ingly, the women in these conservative Sunni families would
 go to public institutions to seek help:
 We went to TEDA§ (the state's electric company), all
 women, our husbands did not have the time. Again it was us,
 the women, who went to the municipality to ask for sewage
 pipes. We went to ask for roads, for steps.
 Bargaining with municipal authorities for infrastructure,
 as well as constructing the infrastructure, was a collective act.
 If the municipality agreed to bring in infrastructure, it might
 take years to do it due to the municipality's limited resources
 and the lower priority given to it. Thus, the local residents took
 on the responsibility to do some of the labor, building roads,
 digging canals for water pipes and erecting electric polls, while
 the municipality mostly provided machinery and construction
 materials, and in some cases, laborers.
 We went to the municipality to ask politely for electric-
 ity, running water, steps, roads. We asked for them and the
 municipality provided them. Everyday one neighbor would
 serve lunch for the laborers. The municipality gave us drain-
 age pipes; our men carried them on their backs. Our hus-
 bands would be out at work during the day, and when they
 came back, they would start digging canals. We, the wives,
 held the lamps to provide light for them. We provided our
 labor. We did it all together.
 Paradoxically, despite the support of municipal authorities
 in the development of the neighborhood, there was always the
 threat of demolition. The people, while trying to pull together
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 their limited material resources to build their houses, had to
 struggle against state authorities to preserve them. Some houses
 were demolished several times, but they were rebuilt by their
 occupants:
 I was pregnant to my third child when they came to
 demolish my house. I built it again in the following night.
 I discovered that if you painted the house, they would not
 demolish it because they would not be able to distinguish it
 as newly built.
 My husband was the master, I was the laborer, we built the
 house together. We had no money. We built a concrete wall to
 keep the soil from sliding. But in the morning they (the munici-
 pal police) came and knocked it down. They would monitor
 us by their binoculars, and they would come to destroy the
 construction when they saw it built. We had some bricks from
 the earlier construction. We built one room, in which our two
 children slept. They again came to demolish it. They knocked
 down one corner. My neighbor started screaming. But this was
 no good; when they heard you scream, they would get angry
 and demolish more. Only the two walls were left undestroyed.
 We had some furniture inside. They knocked down the walls
 on the furniture. When the men went away, we started building
 again. We lived almost three years like that: they demolished
 what we built, and we re-built it.
 There was also the mafia. Many of the residents had to
 pay money for their gecekondu land. Interestingly, the mafia,
 in some cases, played a positive role in the development of
 the gecekondu community, acting as the community leader.
 For example, the mafia leader would bargain with municipal
 authorities for infrastructure and services, bribing, or intimi-
 dating them if necessary He might ask for money in return,
 as observed in other neighborhoods (Asian 2004). The mafia
 leader, as a respondent explained, would also act as a media-
 tor, solving disputes, and as a matchmaker, arranging mar-
 riages.
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 Despite their economic and political vulnerabilities, it was
 the social aspect of gecekondu living that enabled their survival
 in a hostile environment. They reproduced the intimate rela-
 tions of the Gemeinschaft:
 We (nextdoor neighbors) were all like a big family, our
 husbands, our children. We ate together, taking turns, once
 in my house, once in my neighbor's house. Like a family,
 we would sit freely in each other's house, eat together, and
 share our troubles, our joy. We thought of our neighbor's
 children as our own. We trusted each other.
 They improved their gecekondus over the years, for example,
 making a separate kitchen and bringing the toilet inside the
 house, and even covering walls and floors with ceramic tiles.
 They extended their houses by adding rooms and floors, and
 some even built another house on the same plot of their original
 gecekondu , usually placing their newly wed children (usually
 sons) in them. Thus, the early shabby structures were converted
 into sturdy houses with basic conveniences.
 In the 1970s, as leftist mobilization increased its power in
 society, the neighborhood was also affected by it. The resi-
 dents did not join a collective anti-systemic mobilization with
 the leftist groups. Some would give "donation" to the leftist
 youth when they were asked to do so. This was partly out of
 intimidation and partly to be on the side of the powerful. As
 a respondent put it:
 In those times the majority of gecekondu people supported
 the left, but they lacked political consciousness. They had
 come from the village, and what they were looking for was
 a place of their own and a job. When the leftist youth came
 to the neighborhood, most residents complied because they
 needed protection.
 In the mounting of the leftist-rightist violent confronta-
 tions in society, which were widespread in gecekondu areas, the
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 residents of this neighborhood tended to practice the tactic of
 "double loyalty," i.e., expressing loyalty to leftists when they
 were around, and to ultranationalists when they were around.
 Although this carried the risk of perceived betrayal by both
 groups, it proved useful most of the time. Toward the end of
 the 1970s, the neighborhood was largely controlled by ultra-
 nationalists: they would stop people to ask to which group
 they belonged, and they would beat them if they believed they
 were leftists.
 The military intervention changed the rules of the game.
 The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was inserted into society as the
 binding force, which promoted Islam as a bulwark against left-
 ism (Jongerden 2003). Being a devout Muslim became a valued
 property. More mosques were built in the locality. Residents
 expressed their loyalty to Islamist parties in elections and in
 return expected investments in their district.
 The populist urban regime began to be challenged by radical
 changes in political economy, shifting to a neoliberal regime. In
 the 2000s, the outcomes of this shift were experienced in this
 neighborhood, presented below.
 Reflections Of The Neoliberal Urban Coalition In The Sunni Neigh-
 borhood In The 2000s: The Northern Ankara Entrance Urban Trans-
 formation Project (NAEUTP) And Displacement
 In the 2000s, the district received the attention of the mayor
 of the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality as an underdeveloped
 area that put shame on the city by its gecekondus ; it did not fit
 with the image of Ankara as a "world city." As air travel in-
 creased and the airport became a more significant location, this
 district located on the route to the airport received attention and
 became an "eyesore" in the words of the Mayor. As he stated,
 foreign high-ranking bureaucrats, politicians and business
 people would be flying to Ankara more often, and their see-
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 ing ugly gecekondus upon entering the city was unacceptable;
 thus, there was an urgency to demolish the gecekondus and to
 replace them with modern buildings to "beautify" the area and
 to bring it up to the standards of world cities. Legitimized by
 this discourse, the Northern Ankara Entrance Urban Transfor-
 mation Project (NAEUTP) was aggressively put into practice
 in 2004 after a special law was passed at the Parliament (Law
 no. 5104). About 7,000 gecekondus were demolished. The gar-
 dens were destroyed, and the trees which gecekondu residents
 cherished so much were cut down.8 In some cases, it was the
 residents themselves who tore down their houses. The tactic
 of the mayor to allow people to take with them the remaining
 construction materials if they knocked down the houses them-
 selves initiated such behavior. There was only minor resistance
 by the local people, in which a part of the highway connecting
 the city to the airport was occupied by a group of protestors. It
 was broken immediately when the mayor made his appearance
 in the scene together with the police force, making a mixture
 of promises and threats. Many people were caught unguarded
 against the UTP in their belief that "their government" would
 guard their interests.
 Not to lose them all, the mayor offered a compensation
 scheme: those gecekondu owners with titles would receive a
 standard apartment in the new housing complex built by MHA
 in return of their gecekondu land; and those without titles would
 be entitled to apartment ownership in the MHA's social hous-
 ing project by paying a mortgage for about 15 years.9 However,
 it was not received favorably by the majority: in the former
 group, many perceived that it would have been much more
 profitable to exchange their gecekondu land with a muteahhit
 (more general term for yapsatqi ) who would have given more
 than one apartment in return. And in the latter group, many
 families had incomes below the minimum wage, and some did
 not have even regular incomes, which created serious concerns
 about their ability to pay regular installments for 15 years,
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 rendering this pay scheme unrealistic at best. Nonetheless, by
 the tactical maneuvers used in the project's implementation,
 such as promising people to place them in the Municipality's
 temporary housing ( lojman ),10 which would be given on the
 first come first save basis, and many signed the contract and
 handed in their house keys to the authorities.
 In brief, in the practices of dislocation and relocation, their
 gecekondus were demolished and they were placed in high-rise
 blocks of the MHA. Thus, the other outcome of this neoliberal
 urban regime for gecekondu residents was to start living in
 physical environments that were "foreign" to them, i.e., high-
 rise apartment blocks. Different from the earlier era when the
 state was absent in the production of housing for the poor, in
 the new era, rural migrants lost the chance of living in environ-
 ments that were shaped in accordance with their needs and
 preferences, as the state increasingly intervened in the spaces
 of the urban poor.11 In their new housing environments, they
 were expected to change to adapt to apartment life in high-
 rise blocks, living "modern" lives.12 While the majority missed
 their gecekondus and expressed their desire to move back, some
 perceived it as a chance to integrate into urban society. Nev-
 ertheless, their lives and spaces were radically transformed in
 the new era of neoliberal urbanism.
 The following section describes the neighborhood in which
 the Alevis were the majority.
 A Neighborhood in the Eastern Urban Periphery: The Locality of
 the "Oppositional" Alevis
 The neighborhood was in the east of the city on the route to
 Eastern Anatolia. It was built on flat land 10 kilometers from
 the city center Kizilay. It was a low-density residential envi-
 ronment of one- or two-storey houses, with several grocery
 stores run by local people, an elementary school, and a small
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 mosque built after the military intervention. An asphalt road
 entered the neighborhood on which public buses and private
 mini-buses run. The initial section of the neighborhood that
 was built in the 1970s was orderly: a gridiron plan, roads lined
 up with houses on both sides. The sections that were added in
 the following years were irregular, with paths going down to
 the valley and houses scattered without a plan.
 TABLE 2. Administrative Districts From Which The Sunni
 Respondents In The Eastern Periphery Of Ankara
 Came.









 More than 70% of the local population was Alevi and the
 rest was Sunni. Thus, a minority group was the majority in
 this locality. The Ale vis were mostly ethnic Turks, only 1%
 was Kurdish. Most of the residents were from the villages of
 the provinces in Central Anatolia where Ankara is located (see
 Tables 2, 3).
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 TABLE 3. Administrative Districts From Which The Alevi
 Respondents In The Eastern Periphery Of
 Ankara Came.
















 Nevgehir Haci Bekta§
 Building The Gecekondu, The Neighborhood, And The Community
 In The 1970s: The "Liberated Territory" Project Of The Left
 The neighborhood was formed in the 1970s in the context
 of leftist mobilization in the wider society. Before the 1970s,
 the larger gecekondu settlement experienced a formation simi-
 lar to other gecekondu neighborhoods. Gecekondus were built
 here and there by individual families, often with the help of
 relatives. By the 1970s, the part of the settlement closer to the
 city, Tuzlugayir, was full with gecekondus. Thus, when a group
 of leftists wanted to create their own community, they moved
 farther away from the city center and decided on this site. It
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 was then a sparse locality, only 20 to 25 houses, mostly inhab-
 ited by the people working in the brick factory nearby. One of
 the leaders at the time described the neighborhood's building
 process as follows:
 There was no land left to build gecekondus in Tuzlu^ayir, so
 we moved here. We were about 150 families. We were going to
 build a community of our own. But my friends gave up when
 they found out that the land was the nearby village's pasture.
 They said it would conflict with their socialist moral values, that
 they would never take away land from villagers. But the village
 muhtar13 would sell the land anyway.
 Interestingly, the muhtar acted like the gecekondu mafia, selling
 for profit the land that belonged to the village. Taking a stand
 against this practice, this respondent, along with some 70 other
 families, stayed and started to build the neighborhood. He called
 his friends from Tuzlugayir to help develop the neighborhood.
 Thus, the leftist youth provided physical labor to construct the
 infrastructure, digging canals for drainage pipes, erecting electric
 posts, and building roads. Leftist architecture students drew
 the plan of the neighborhood, and the leftist youth distributed
 the land to those who needed a house to live in. Doing all this
 was a continuous struggle for the leftists, trying both to have
 access to resources (pipes, posts, etc.) and to persuade the local
 people that they could succeed. They now and then used their
 relations with their acquaintances in public offices. In the words
 of a former leader: "I had a relative in the department of Water
 Works. By his help, I got a truck full of pipes. When the people
 saw the pipes, they completely believed us; they believed that
 we would keep our promises."
 In the process of the construction of the neighborhood, con-
 tacts with state authorities, contrary to what would be expected,
 were kept: negotiations would continue between the local people,
 or the leftists in some cases, and municipal authorities about
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 bringing services, such as building a school building. One such
 negotiation was stated by a former activist as follows:
 There was this rumor that the governor was a fascist, but he
 treated us well. He said, "People say that you are communists,
 that you collect money from people for your own cause. But I
 know that you are good people. I know that you also give money
 (to construct the school building). I will help you (build the
 school building). But, in return I want you to wipe the slogans
 off the walls."
 The mafia was kept out by the leftists: in their anti-capitalistic
 ideology, they were committed to put an end to profit-oriented
 gecekondu development.
 In this process, the locality was constructed collectively by the
 local people and the leftist youth. There was collective action to
 make the locality a better place to live. For example, rallies were
 organized to protest the garbage dump in the neighborhood.
 Women would stand in front of the garbage trucks to prevent
 their entrance. Consequently, people developed a special rela-
 tionship with the locality, not only as their neighborhood which
 they constructed but also as the site of their political struggle.
 In brief, different from the first neighborhood's spontaneous
 formation, this neighborhood's development was a planned one
 in which profit-seeking actors were kept out; it was also a politi-
 cally induced and strictly controlled process. The urban coalition
 of the time, with its capitalist profit-orientedness, political popu-
 lism and the subordination of the gecekondu population, was left.
 Instead a new development model of the neighborhood, which
 promised power and advantages to the local population, was
 adopted. However, this time the left intervened in the lives of the
 gecekondu people: they wanted to transform rural migrants into
 the "working class." Many of the local Alevis allied with the left,
 whereas the local religious Sunnis reacted negatively to the leftist
 presence in the neighborhood, yet they were repressed by the
 leftist youth. Consequently, the neighborhood gained a political
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 identity as the site of leftists. When the military intervened on
 September 12, 1980, the people were traumatized: many were
 arrested and jailed, tortured and even killed. A woman sadly
 mentioned: "There was a young university student who came to
 our house and solved our electricity problem. He did not show
 up again. I was worried. Later I found out that he was killed."
 Following the military coup d'etat, the neighborhood was
 administratively reorganized, divided into five smaller neighbor-
 hoods. Ironically, two of the new neighborhoods were named
 after two generals who were involved in the military coup. A
 police station was set up in the larger district, and again ironically,
 it was called "Yavuz Sultan Selim Police Station," the Ottoman
 Sultan who the Alevis hate because of their belief that he killed
 many Alevis during his war against the Safavid Shah Ismail in
 Iran. Moreover, the name of the local school was changed to
 "Yavuz Sultan Selim Elementary School," although the local
 people called it "Democracy Elementary School." As one of the
 respondents put it: "They did it out of spite" (bize inat ). These
 symbolic oppressive measures of the state were complemented
 by physical interventions. A mosque was built by the state de-
 spite the fact that, as an Alevi resident put it, "we have nothing
 to do with the mosque." A former leftist leader, an Alevi, also
 said: "We were sure that a mosque could never be built here,
 that this neighborhood was safe, that it would always be free of
 mosques. Yet, right after the 1980 military takeover, they built
 this mosque (in 1981) to defy us."14
 After the violent intervention of the state into the neighbor-
 hood during the coup d'etat, many families attempted to protect
 their children from harm by keeping them out of politics. In
 this new political milieu, leftists fell out of grace; they lost their
 status in the eyes of many residents. Some isolated themselves,
 some left the neighborhood, and some tried to survive, trying
 to repoliticize the local population.
 The growth of the neighborhood continued through the
 1980s. The mafia was back, and so was the resistance to it. The
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 Alevi woman muhtar took the lead. As a woman respondent
 described, she would walk around at night with a pistol in her
 belt, checking on the neighborhood to prevent the action of the
 mafia; she would stand by the bulldozer, giving orders to build
 houses on the land claimed by the mafia.
 In brief, in this neighborhood, a new model of gecekondu
 development was practiced, which was a planned one and
 which was kept out of profit-oriented concerns. It was part of
 the leftist "liberated territory" project that challenged the status
 quo. Interestingly, despite the claims about the project that it
 remained outside the state, people never lost their contacts with
 the authorities, bargaining for some services and infrastructure.
 It was ruptured by the military coup, putting an end to radical
 politics and practices. How this affected the relationship of the
 neighborhood with the state in the neoliberal regime is elabo-
 rated below.
 Reflections Of The Neoliberal Urban Coalition In The Alevi Neigh-
 borhood In The 2000s: Dialectics Of Resistance And Cooptation
 In 1992, an urban transformation project (UTP) was proposed
 by the social democrat mayor of the time who believed that it
 would benefit this "leftist" neighborhood. It was the pioneer of
 such projects. However, it was stopped by the local people when
 they were mobilized against it by the Alevi woman muhtar. The
 rumor is that she had several gecekondu plots for which she did
 not have title deeds, and hence the project would work to her
 disadvantage. It was in 2006 that another UTP was initiated, this
 time by the JDP's district mayor. The present muhtar, an Alevi
 man with leftist leanings, gave conditional support to the project.
 He wanted "modern" apartment buildings in the places of the
 gecekondus, but he insisted that the original project should be
 revised to enable the local people to sell their gecekondu plots
 to muteahhits instead of giving them to the local government in
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 return for standard apartments in the MHA's housing project.
 This meant more apartments to receive in exchange for their
 land, and hence more profit for gecekondu land owners. His
 struggles, through lawsuits and political challenges, against the
 original form of the UTP bore results, and an "atypical" UTP in
 the locality was implemented, which allowed the people who
 had titles to their land to sell them to mtiteahhits.12 Thus, it was
 the muhtar who affected the decisions about the UTP. Accord-
 ingly, this points to the significant role the muhtars play in the
 formation and transformation of gecekondu neighborhoods,
 reinforcing or challenging the prevailing urban coalition.
 This transformation of the locality also fit the interests of
 the mayor. Transforming the physical environment from a
 gecekondu settlement to a settlement of high-rise apartment
 blocks would bring social and political transformation. The
 Alevi majority in the locality would be gone, along with the
 leftist rule and the potential of political resistance. The first
 building built in the neighborhood after the UTP was put into
 action was a huge mosque and a tall apartment complex next
 to it, built by a Sunni local developer on the land he owned.
 In the meanwhile, resistance to the Mamak UTP in the larger
 district emerged. This project, in the partnership of MHA and
 the Mamak municipal government, would demolish 15,000
 gecekondus to transform the area into a middle-class district.
 It was the proof that the new urban coalition excluded the
 gecekondu population. The project would displace the gecekondu
 residents from their neighborhoods and relocate them to the
 MHA's projects in distant locations. Those residents with title
 deeds would be given an apartment in the MHA's housing
 projects in return of their gecekondu land, and those without title
 deeds as well as tenants, who would have been "tolerated" in
 the populist regime of national developmentalism, faced the
 prospect of eviction. Leftist groups organized resistance to the
 project, basing their discourse on people's right to their neigh-
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 borhood and homes, protesting the municipality's practices of
 displacement and forced relocation of the urban poor.
 Stated briefly, while the particular neighborhood where the
 ethnographic fieldwork was conducted was coopted by the
 individual material gains which the local UTP brought to the
 majority of residents, resistance was organized in the larger
 district against the Mamak UTP. Today, conflict and contesta-
 tion grow between local populations and municipal govern-
 ments in the urban periphery where UTPs are in the process
 of implementation. While the "new urban coalition" is trying
 to consolidate itself, it is facing some resistance.
 Conclusion
 The two gecekondu neighborhoods had their distinctive
 characteristics largely shaped by their geographical locations.
 This led to the spatial concentration of particular populations,
 namely, conservative Sunnis that supported the right-wing and
 Islam-leaning political parties [Sunni; right-wing (SR)], and "op-
 positional" Alevis that supported the left-wing political parties
 [Alevi; left-wing (AL)]. The local composition brought them
 some advantages/ disadvantages in a particular era, which
 turned into disadvantages/ advantages in a different era. They
 differed from each other significantly in terms of the processes
 of their formations and transformations into apartment districts,
 situating themselves differently in the "urban coalitions" of the
 two different eras. While the first neighborhood where mainly
 conservative Sunnis lived (SR) was formed by the collective acts
 of individual families without any engagement with outside po-
 litical groups, the second neighborhood where Alevis were the
 majority (AL) developed as part of a political project of the left.
 Accordingly, while the SR developed as a spontaneous neighbor-
 hood, with houses scattered here and there and whose services
 and infrastructure were obtained by bargaining with municipal
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 authorities, the AL developed as a planned locality which was
 kept outside profit-seeking agents and whose basic infrastruc-
 ture was built by the collective effort of the leftist youth and the
 local people. In the politicized environment of the 1970s, while
 the SR remained largely outside radical collective action, the AL
 became a hot spot of leftist mobilization. Accordingly, when the
 military intervened on September 12, 1980, the SR moved quite
 smoothly into the 1980s, while the AL, confronted with the op-
 pressive measures of the state, lived in danger. In their approach
 to the UTPs, in the SR, despite their loyalty to the ruling political
 party, the residents as the urban poor were powerless in object-
 ing to the UTP implemented in their district. Their inexperience
 of collective mobilization and their trust in the ruling party to
 which they had given full support rendered them ineffective,
 failing to organize themselves collectively to stop the project or
 to bargain with the mayor to revise it to bring them some ad-
 vantages. On the other hand, in the AL, in the local leadership
 of the muhtar, the UTP was revised to bring advantages to the
 gecekondu owners who were the majority in the neighborhood,
 while those without title deeds and tenants, who constituted a
 very small number of the residents, were victimized. The AL
 carried the potential to resist the UTP: the residents could easily
 join the collective resistance growing against another UTP in the
 wider district, which was built upon the past experiences of col-
 lective mobilization of residents. But they did not resist because
 of the advantages gained by the majority. Consequently, while
 in the AL the transformation of the gecekondu neighborhood was
 carried out by private developers who would build apartment
 buildings on the same plot of the gecekondus without displacing
 the gecekondu owners and with whom they had the chance to
 bargain for more apartments, in the SR the neighborhood was
 completely demolished in the UTP and the residents were dis-
 located from their gecekondus to be relocated in the apartments
 in the MHA' s housing project which they obtained in exchange
 of their gecekondu land.
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 All in all, while the urban coalition of the populist era (i.e.,
 national devlopmentalism) brought some bargaining power to
 the gecekondu population, the new urban coalition in the neolib-
 eral era divided the gecekondu population: while some found the
 opportunity of making material gains from their gecekondu land,
 others were stripped of the "power" that they had in the populist
 era. While the former were included in the urban coalition as
 increasingly profit-seeking subjects, the latter were dislocated
 and relocated to faraway places where, as poor people, they
 were rendered invisible in the efforts of municipal authorities
 to make their cities attractive to investments and tourists, free of
 gecekondus. Moreover, rural migrants lost their chance of living
 in environments that responded to their needs and preferences;
 they are now placed in environments shaped by the state to bring
 "modern" and "urban" lives to the "peasants in the city."
 But such radical restructuring of cities is not easy to put into
 practice. The coming years are ripe with bargaining, and even
 with violent confrontations between gecekondu people and the
 authorities, as the state's intervention in the urban periphery
 intensifies.
 NOTES
 1 Gecekondu is the name given to squatter housing in Turkey. It liter-
 ally means "landed in the night."
 2 Alevis are the largest minority group in Turkish society (18-25% of
 Turkey's population). They are known for their oppositional stance
 against the state, despite the fact that they are dedicated supporters
 of Atatiirk and his secular Republic. They lived in isolated villages
 during the Ottoman times, establishing their own sociolegal system
 (Kehl-Bodrogi 2003; Vorhoff 2003). Their religious practices and
 institutions weakened upon their mass migration to big cities from
 their rural habitus since the 1950s. Many Alevis participated in the
 leftist mobilization of society in the 1960s and 1970s, which further
 pushed their religion out of their lives (Vorhoff 2003). In the politics
 of identity of the 1990s, they asserted their collective identity and
 demanded recognition (Bruinessen 1996; Erman and Goker 2000).
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 Many intensified their support of the secular Turkish Republic in
 recent years upon their perception of the Islamist threat. Alevism
 differs from orthodox Sunni Islam in terms of its liberal religious
 beliefs and practices, such as gender mixing, and the consump-
 tion of alcohol, dancing (semah) and the play of the saz (traditional
 musical instrument) in religious rituals (the cem ). (See, Bruinessen
 1996, Olsson et al. 1998, and White and Jongerden 2003, for more
 information on Alevis.)
 3 Some of the actors in this competition would be "hyper" markets,
 housing cooperatives, real estate companies, the nouveau riche to
 build their luxurious villas, and private universities to build their
 campuses (I§ik and Pmarcioglu 2001: 168),
 4 The party defines itself as "conservative democratic." On the other
 hand, the view that it is the extension of Islamist parties persists in
 "secular" groups.
 5 The housing projects carried out by the MHA-private sector part-
 nership, with their own sports facilities (tennis and golf courts,
 swimming pools), high-tech surveillance, luxurious apartments
 with roof gardens in skyscrapers (40 + stories), can be very presti-
 gious, catering for the desires of the very rich. See, for example, the
 "My World" "My Towerland" "My Office" Projects of the Agaoglu
 Company in Ata§ehir.
 6 Municipalities prefer MHA over private contractors because of
 MHA's advantages, such as obtaining state land for free and relo-
 cating the displaced population in its social housing projects.
 7 Funding for the first project was provided by TUBITAK, the Scien-
 tific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (June 15, 2007
 - June 15, 2008); and the second project was carried out by Bilkent's
 research grant (2001-2003).
 8 In the in-depth interviews, many respondents talked about their
 gardens and the trees that they had lost with tears in their eyes.
 9 The gecekondu land tenure is complicated: there are those who own
 legal titles, along with those who own shares from an agricultural
 land ( hisseli tapu) and those who have temporary title deeds (tapu
 tahsis belgesi). There are also tenants who are the most disadvan-
 taged group in an UTP.
 10 The lojmans were equipped with 24-hour hot water and central
 heating, increasing the attraction for gecekondu residents.
 11 It is necessary to recognize the limited economic conditions and
 technical knowledge of gecekondu builders as well as the threats
 of demolition under which gecekondus were constructed, which
 put severe limits to construct an "ideal" home. Nevertheless, the
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 low density housing environment with houses in gardens and the
 semi-public /semi-private spaces in front of houses responded to
 the needs and preferences of rural migrants (see Erman 1997).
 12 For example, no place to air woolen mattresses and no outdoor
 ovens ( tandir ) to make bread were provided in the MHA's proj-
 ects.
 13 The muhtar is the elected representative of an urban neighborhood
 or a village.
 14 Interestingly, a generic term "mosques of defiance" (" inat camileri")
 has been coined to refer to the mosques built against "secularists."
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